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Abstract 
Tourist spot s public operational vehicles occupy the monopoly position in the market of tourist passenger transport, but they have a 
great defect of service quality which has a bad influence on the positive image of the tourist spot. Introducing private operational vehicles 
into the market is suggested which makes a corporate operation of public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles. Based on 
this, a cooperative game model is proposed and a kind of cooperation mode which makes the profit distribution reasonable and the alliance 
stable is sought. The results indicate that the formation of cooperative alliance can increase the profit of both sides and can increase the 
overall social benefits of tourist spot simultaneously. 
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1 Introduction  
With the improvement of living standard people's travel demand is increasing which results on the rapid growth of 
tourist spot tourists. Tourist passenger transport develops simultaneously as a part of tourist industry. Tourist 
passenger transport includes road tourist passenger transport and tourist spot passenger transport. Road tourist passenger 
transport is the displacement transfer process traveling from the residence to tourist destination; tourist spot passenger 
transport is the displacement transfer process traveling among the tourist attractions within tourist spot. 
But the tourist spot passenger transport begins to confront a great challenge with the rapid development of tourist 
industry. Travelers have met a series of problems when they take tourism transportation, such as the overcrowded 
compartment, poor attitude of the staff, the single option of transport vehicle type and the vehicle s failure in departure or 
arrival on time which greatly reduce the satisfaction of the travelers on the tourist spot and is not conducive to the positive 
image transmission of tourist spot. Consequently, a good organization and coordination of the tourist passenger transport is of 
great significance. 
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At present, the research about tourist passenger transport is mainly on the road tourist passenger transport, theory 
research on tourist passenger transport[1], tourist passenger transport pricing[2][3], research on the behavior of tourist spot 
transport mode choice[4]. While the research about the tourist spot passenger transport is very few which only limited to the 
development and layout of the passenger line[5]. 
For the current phenomenon that tourist spot s public operational vehicles occupy monopoly situation, this paper 
recommends the full introduction of private operational vehicles to force the competition under cooperative condition. After 
analyzing the business behavior of both sides with cooperative theory, a cooperative game model aiming at the largest joint 
effectiveness is built. Finally, the Mount Emei Scenic Area, Sichuan, China is selected as a case study, then the best solution 
of the cooperative game model about tourist spot public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles is obtained. 
* 
  
2 About cooperative game theory 
Cooperative game is a game that the interests of both sides increase or at least one s interests increases in the 
condition that the other party will not be harmed, therefore the overall interests increases. Two-person bargain is the basic 
problem of cooperative game, it is a problem about how to divide the interrelated gains (profit) between two players, that is to 
say, achieve greater co-interest and self-interest of both sides by coordinating behaviors with a contract in the situation that 
they have common but not entirely consistent interests. 
Public operational vehicles are owned by tourist spot and the operating income belongs to tourist spot, private 
operational vehicles are owned by individuals and the operating income belongs to individuals. Both incomes are related to 
the quantity of the passengers they carried. In fact, it is the segmentation of tourist spot passenger market. The competition 
between the tourist spot public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles is a kind of game, both sides are 
considering how to improve their income in the competitive process. Currently, public operational vehicles and private 
operational vehicles are in the opposite position and both sides are snatching passenger transport market through a variety of 
means. Some unreasonable behaviors lead to the dissatisfaction of tourists which will easily result in the loss of tourists 
causing the shrink of entire passenger travel market. 
Actually, the relationship between tourist spot public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles can transform 
to cooperative game. If the overall passenger number increases, the income of both sides will increase, which is their common 
interests. However they differ in travel time and price when compete with each other, so their interests are not exactly 
consistent. Thus, the tourist spot public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles can be taken as a two-person 
bargaining game. If a cooperation agreement which offer a cooperative way to have a reasonable split of gains achieving the 
increase of interests of the two sides ultimately can be reached, then this cooperative method can be long-term implementation 
and the cooperative alliance can be stable, at the same time, the healthy development of the tourist spot passenger market can 
be promoted.  
3 Game analysis on tourist spot s public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles  
The basic elements of two-person bargain problem: (1) Feasible alternative set S . The feasible allocation set of 
two-person bargain is given by 1 2 1 2( , ) 0 ,iS s s s m s s m , 1s  and 2s  represent the benefit of two sides 
respectively, m represents the maximum divisible benefits. (2) The expected utility of players is given by iu . Generally, 
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iu is a function of their own benefit ( )i i iu u s . (3) Disagreement point d . Disagreement point is given by 1 2( , )d d d , 
id  represents the benefit of player i  when the negotiation is broke down. Cooperative game makes no sense when the utility 
brought by bargaining game is less than that of disagreement point because it is not be able to achieve better results than 
individual rational game.  
For the two-person bargain cooperative game about public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles, its result 
depends on the joint rational behavior of game players. So, cooperative game analysis should focus on the joint rational 
behavior and the results of two sides rather than individual rational decision-making. In addition, what kind of distribution and 
utility configuration is most likely to be accepted by the game players should be studied. The cooperative game model about 
scenic public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles is built in this paper to segment the scenic tourist passenger 
market, namely to assign the volume of passenger traffic to the public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles 
making the utility is greater after the cooperation. 
4 Cooperative game model formulation 
4.1 Fundamental assumption 
The cooperative game model about public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles built in this paper is 
based on the following assumptions: (1) the two game players both are rational and only accept solution of which the utility is 
better than current case. (2) There is no difference in the players  risk appetite and risk-neutral character with no risk aversion 
is assumed here. (3) The utility function (the benefit of game players) of players are just the function of the number of 
passengers carried, that is to say, benefit =price passenger capacity. (4) Travelers only consider three aspects, traveling 
expenses, waiting time and travel time and cabin environment which correspond to the economy, punctuality and comfort 
respectively when they choose the tourist spot transportation. (5) Assume that the travelers who choose private operational 
vehicles are absolutely satisfied with the tourist spot because of the high service quality of private operational vehicles. 
Moreover, part of the travelers will have a positive publicity about tourist spot which drives the increase in the number of 
tourists. Public operational vehicles have a lower fare while the overlong waiting time and poor comfort will reduce the 
satisfaction of tourists to tourist spot. It is assumed that the two sides are equal in the course of the game because they have 
their own different competitive advantages. 
4.2 Parameters 
Model parameters are described below  
N  The average daily passenger capacity namely the total number of tourists who take the tourist spot public 
operational vehicles and private operational vehicles. 
T  The total time of the transport vehicle which includes waiting time and vehicle travel time characterizes the 
punctuality of the transport vehicle. 
t  The monetary value of the total time of the transport vehicle when it is converted into the currency. 
p  The fare of the transportation which characterizes its economy.  
lim1 lim2  Represent the price ceiling of public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles respectively. In 
another word, the tourist spot have to not support excessive fare for the welfare of people. 
c  A parameter about comfort which values between 0-1. If the cabin environment is more comfortable, the value of c  
is greater. 
1 2 3w w w  The weight of punctuality, economy, comfort in the cost function which can be regarded as the 
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( )
importance of these factors when choose transportation and the value of w  derives from the existing literature. 
if  The cost spent by travelers when choose transport vehicle i , 1i  represents public operational vehicles and 
2i represents private operational vehicles. 
iU  The benefits obtained by travelers when choose transport vehicles i . 
 The conversion parameter of the cost function and passenger benefit function which values between 0-1. Greater 
value means that travelers are more sensitive to costs, that is to say, the travelers feel smaller discrepancy due to the different 
cost. It is assumed that all travelers  cost sensitivity are the same for the less complexity of this model and the value is 1. 
is  The proportion of travelers who choose transport vehicle i , namely the market share occupied by the transport 
vehicle i . It equals the probability of travelers choosing transport vehicles i . 
( )iu s  The utility of player i  which is a function of the market share ( )i iu s s N p .  
id  The market share of transport vehicle i in the current situation of non-cooperation. 
M  The income increased which is brought by adding each tourist and it is given by ticket income here.  
1PO 2PO  The fare of public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles under the current condition of 
non-cooperation.  
1p 2p  Decision variable. The value of p  which represents the fare of transport vehicles after cooperation decides 
the market share 1s 2s of players. 
r  The number of additional visitors caused by the positive word-of-mouth of each satisfied traveler.  
q  Intensity of the dissemination of information denotes the probability of positive word-of-mouth publicity which is 
performed by travelers.     
k  The level of the acception of positive message when spread to the potential visitors. If a potential visitor fully accepts 
the tourist spot positive message he will become a tourist spot visitor.  
l  The friends who are willing to travel to the tourist spot in the communication circle of tourists. 1BO 2BO  The 
benefit of public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles under the current condition of non-cooperation.  
1B 2B  The benefit of public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles after cooperation. 
4.3 Cooperative game model 
The basic model to solve cooperative game "Nash bargaining solution "can be given by a optimization mathematical 
model as follows: 
 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2max ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))u s u d u s u d    1 
S.T.  1 2 1s s                                                           2  
  1 1 1 1( ) (u s u d                                                      3  
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     2 2 2 2( ) ( )u s u d                                                     4  
In the competitive market conditions, travelers will choose transport vehicles which offer maximum benefits. In order to 
reduce the computational complexity, the market share occupied by transport vehicles is represented by the passenger 
selection probability of transport vehicles. The passenger selection probability of transport vehicles is described by Logit 
model which is based on random utility theory. The time is converted into monetary costs basing on the assumption that the 
time value of travelers is 30 RMB per hour, namely 30t T .
The cost spent by travelers when choose transport vehicle i  is 1 2 3i i i if w t w p w c . The benefits obtained by 
travelers when choose transport vehicles i  is i iU f . 
In this paper, 1, then the passenger selection probability of transport vehicles i ( the market share occupied by 
transport vehicles i ) is given as follows: 

1 2 3
1 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 21 2
( )
( ) ( )
i i i if w t w p w c
i w t w p w c w t w p w cf f
e es
e e e e
     5  
The utility of the two game players under the current condition of non-cooperation is given as follows: 
( )i i i iu d PO d N   6  
If the two sides build a cooperation allowing private operational vehicles fully enter into the passenger market, the 
travelers who choose private operational vehicles will increase which results in that the number of satisfied visitors also 
increase. According to the rules of positive word-of-mouth spread, the number of tourist spot visitors will increase due to the 
positive publicity on the tourist spot and the word-of-mouth effect follows certain rules. Additional number of tourists which 
is increased by each satisfied traveler with positive word-of-mouth effect is given by r . According to the theoretical model of 
word-of-mouth effect, r q k l . The income of tourist spot increased due to the increase of tourists is 2s N r M .The 
gains of public vehicles is replaced by the gains of tourist spot because the operating income of public vehicles and ticket 
revenue belong to the tourist spot 1 1 1 1 2( )u s s N p s N qkl M      
7   
Plug equation (5),(6),(7) into equation (1),(2),(3),(4), then the final mathematical model about the cooperative game of 
tourist spot public vehicles and private vehicles can be given as follows: 
1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2max (( ) ) ( )p s N s N qkl M PO d N s p N PO d N                    8  
S.T.  1 2 1s s                                                                  9  
10 1s 20 1s                                                      10  
    1 1 2 1 1( )s p N s N qkl M PO d N                                             11  
2 2 2 2p s N PO d N                                                       12  
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1 1 2 1 3 1
1 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 2
( )
1 ( ) ( )
w t w p w c
w t w p w c w t w p w c
es
e e
                           13                       
1 2p p                                                                   14  
1 20 lim1,0 lim2p p                                             15  
Equation (8) is the objective function which represents the maximum joint benefit of public operational vehicles and 
private operational vehicles. Constraint (9) ensures that the sum of the market share occupied by the two sides is 100%. 
Constraint (10) requires that any side cannot hold the whole tourist passenger transport market. Constraint (11) and (12) 
ensure that the gain of the two sides after cooperation is greater than current gains. Constraint (13) shows the relationship 
between market share and transport fare. Constraint (14) is used to guarantee a higher fare of private vehicles because private 
vehicles are more comfortable and speedily than private vehicles. Constraint (15) requires that the final cooperative price can 
not be higher than the price cap according to the relevant provision.  
5 Case study 
5.1 Data analysis 
Mount Emei Scenic Area, Sichuan Province, China is selected as a case study and the relevant data is obtained from 
Sichuan Provincial Tourism Bureau and the statistics of the Mount Emei Scenic Area. According to the current operational 
passenger line of the Mount Emei Scenic, select the section of Wannian Temple station to Baoguo Temple station as a research 
subject which is 10 kilometers approximately. The waiting time and travel time of public operational vehicles are 30 minutes 
and 40 minutes respectively and its fare is 20(RMB). The waiting time of private operational vehicles whose fare is 45(RMB) 
is 10 minutes and travel time is no more than 30 minutes. According to statistics, about 80% of the travelers in this section 
take the tourist spot public operational vehicles in the current situation. The current fare of Mount Emei Scenic Area prices at 
150(RMB). 
For the comfort factor of public and private operational vehicles, c  is given by 1 20.7, 1c c . What s more, in order 
to reduce computational complexity, the parameters about positive word-of-mouth effect and weight of punctuality, economy, 
comfort is valued according to the existing literature. The value of parameters is given in Table 1. 
Table 1 The value of parameters 
parameter value parameter value parameter value parameter value 
PO1 
20 RMB
 
M 150 RMB  d1 d2 0.8 0.2 q  0.1 
PO2 
45 RMB
 
T1 T2 
1.16 h  
0.66 h  
lim1 
lim2 
[25,35] 
60 
k  0.2 
C1  
C2 
0.7  
1 
W1 W2  
W3 
0.12 0.47 10 N 
3161 
(people) 
l  5 (people) 
5.2 Model solution 
The cooperative game model is solved on a Core 2 computer with 1.86GHz and 1GB RAM using Lingo software. 
When the price ceiling of public operational vehicles is 25(RMB), the model solution results are shown in Fig.1. 
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( )

Fig.1. Model solution  
The solving results indicate that the cooperative game model about tourist spot public operational vehicles and private 
operational vehicles established is nonlinear programming model (NLP) and it has a global optimal solution Global Opt . 
Different price ceiling of public operational vehicles go with different optimal price cooperation programs (see Table 2). 
Table 2 The optimal cooperation programs with different price ceiling 

1p  1s  1BO  1B  2p  2s  2BO  2B  
Lim1=25 25 0.4442 50576 61455.61 34.74 0.5558 28449 61028.55 
Lim1=27 27 0.4426 50576 64205.30 36.72 0.5574 28449 64697.90 
Lim1=29 29 0.4425 50576 66999.17 38.72 0.5575 28449 68232.46 
Lim1=30 30 0.4428 50576 68410.38 39.72 0.5572 28449 69965.85 
Lim1=32 32 0.4437 50576 71257.72 41.73 0.5563 28449 73384.31 
Lim1=34 34 0.4449 50576 74134.25 43.74 0.5551 28449 76754.70 
Lim1=35 35 0.4455 50576 75582.19 44.75 0.5545 28449 78426.18 
Conclusions can be drawn from the above solution results: (1) Different price ceiling of public operational vehicles
Lim1 goes with different optimal price cooperation program and the gains of the two sides after cooperation( 1B 2B ) both 
are greater than non-cooperation( 1BO 2BO ).(2) In any case, the joint benefit of the two sides goes most when the public 
operational vehicles and private operational vehicles occupy the market share( 1s 2s ) approximately 44% and 56% 
respectively, and the fare of private operational vehicles( 2p ) is always higher than that of public operational vehicles( 1p ) 
around 9.7(RMB). 
6 Conclusions 
The above calculating results indicate that the full introduction of private operational vehicles to build an alliance with 
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tourist spot public operational vehicles and agreement on an optimal price program can obtain the most significant increase in 
individual income and joint benefit as well. The cooperative game model established about tourist spot public operational 
vehicles and private operational vehicles validates that the gains of the two players after cooperation are greater than that of 
non-cooperation. Moreover, the optimal cooperation program varies from different price ceiling of public operational vehicles 
which can be acquired based on this cooperative game model which provides effective theoretical reference for the tourist 
spot in finding the best price program which aims to the optimal benefit of whole tourist passenger market. 
 The cooperative game about tourist spot public operational vehicles and private operational vehicles studied in this 
paper is to have a re-segmentation of the scenic tourist passenger market by taking advantage of the adjustment of price. 
Actually, the adjustment of vehicle schedules will also have an influence in the passenger market share. Therefore, this 
research can be extended by a cooperative game model considering both fare and departure time interval of vehicles in the 
future. 
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